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 1 
Agencement in Housing Markets: The Case of the UK Construction 
Industry  
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses a paradox in UK housing construction, namely its ‘lock-in’ to 
masonry house building – a socio-technical assemblage which endures, despite 
recognised shortcomings, even in the wake of government policies encouraging 
factory-based prefabricated alternatives.  Combining theoretical inspiration from 
recent work on the cultural economy and material sociology of markets with empirical 
research on innovation in the home building industry, we weigh up the forces for 
inertia against the impulse for change in methods of housing construction. The 
analysis shows that while the case for and against innovation appears to turn on 
financial costs and benefits (it is a calculation debate), in practice, social, cultural and 
technical differences – struggles over the assemblage and agencement of housing 
construction markets – are the critical issues underpinning UK resistance to 
prefabrication. Practically, we argue that government needs a better appreciation of 
this complexity if its aim is to encourage innovation. Theoretically, we advocate a 
firmer distinction between the concept of assemblage - a description of markets - and 
that of agencement - a property or quality of them.  
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Introduction 
This paper addresses a paradox in UK housing construction, namely its ‘lock-in’ to 
masonry methods of construction. This is the traditional method of house-building in 
the UK (Barlow, 2000; Ross, 2002), which accounts for most of the existing stock and 
as much as eighty-five per cent of new build (Building Talk, 2006). Its dominance is 
paradoxical because it is costly, inflexible and inefficient in a variety of ways (Barker, 
2003; Ross, 2002; Williams, 1997): it is sluggish in adjusting to demand across the 
housing cycle (Barker, 2004; Bartlett, 2002; Williams, 1997), and is at odds with 
some key goals of UK housing policy including the pursuit of a ready supply of 
affordable and environmentally sustainable accommodation (Communities and Local 
Government, 2006; ODPM, 2003b). Although there are, as we shall demonstrate, 
barriers to directly comparing systems of housing construction, it is surprising that 
markets for alternative methods of construction, such as prefabrication, have been so 
slow to get underway (National Audit Office, 2005; The Housing Forum, 2001). 
 
To explore this tension in UK housing construction the paper draws from, and 
enlarges, a conceptual toolkit developed to explore more broadly the cultural 
economy and material sociology of markets. One of the major intellectual 
achievements of the last decade has been to open up the black box of the economy to 
scrutiny from disciplines other than economics. This has prompted a comprehensive 
rethink of what markets are, as well as drawing (somewhat less) attention to how they 
change. Certainly scholars are beginning to recognise the diversity and particularity of 
markets, the practicalities of their operation, their material form, their emotional 
qualities, their sociality and their agency (Barry and Slater, 2002; Callon, 1998b; 
Hardie and Mackenzie, 2007; MacKenzie, 2006; Munro and Smith, 2008; Pryke, 
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2007; Smith, Munro and Christie, 2006).  Two traditions of working are particularly 
important for this paper: cultural economy, which recognises that the creation and 
performation of markets is rooted partly in a struggle around ideas, for example about 
what the economy is (see Amin and Thrift, 2004); and material sociology, which is 
concerned with the assemblage of people, things, methods and mechanisms of 
calculation, and so on, into an economy which is lived, practised, experienced, 
embodied and indeed materialised, in different times and places (see Callon and 
Muniesa, 2005; MacKenzie, 2008). 
 
Thinking about housing markets from a perspective that recognises markets to be 
‘concrete’ things (Callon and Muniesa, 2005: 1229) is rather apt for this paper, since 
we draw attention to what is arguably the most ‘concrete’ of material markets, that of 
housing. This is in contrast to much of the existing economic sociology literature 
which, paradoxically, is concerned mainly with teasing out the social and material 
content of more abstract, virtual, financial, markets (Callon, 1998b; Hardie and 
Mackenzie, 2007; Pryke, 2007). It is curious that, with a few notable exceptions 
(Bourdieu, 2005; Munro and Smith, 2008; Smith, 2008) the most material of markets 
- housing – has been left out of this frame.  By reporting on markets of housing 
construction we therefore help place a new (and rather large) piece into the jigsaw 
whose finished form represents a fresh, revised view of what the economy is and how 
it functions.  Moreover by bringing housing into this frame we introduce a 
contribution from one of the world’s largest economic markets – a system of 
construction, distribution and exchange whose workings themselves impact on these 
new understandings of economy. 
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We recognise that there is an extensive literature within science and technology 
studies (STS) on how socio-technical systems regimes or systems function, and how 
‘lock-in’ can inhibit change (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Schot, Hoogma and Elzen, 1994; 
Unruh, 2002). However the majority of this socio-technical regime literature does not 
pay close attention to the issues of economics and finance which are so critical in 
understanding what drives markets for housing construction. This is why we favour 
innovations in cultural economy and material sociology as the starting point for our 
analysis here. Nevertheless, the re-conceptualisation of markets that inspires this 
paper itself has STS roots (consider for example Callon’s (1986) early work on 
electric vehicle innovation and MacKenzie’s (1990; 1996) previous interests in 
technological innovation of all kinds), and where appropriate we do refer to the links 
between these traditions. It should not be surprising to find some overlap between the 
way the terms ‘market’ and ‘socio-technical regime’ are used in these literatures, but 
to avoid confusion we place markets at the centre of the analysis, recognising that an 
actually existing market is, in its broad interdisciplinary setting,  “..a many-sided 
diversified, evolving device” (Callon, 1998a: 55), which is “..made ‘economic’, 
through a complex interplay of cultural, legal, political and institutional 
arrangements” (Smith, Munro and Christie, 2006: 95). 
 
The UK housing construction industry has not been looked at in this way before, but 
as a market ready for, yet ambivalent towards, change, it is an apt case study.  
Consider the following three paradoxes.  First, although the UK has a uniquely dated 
housing stock with a slow replacement rate (DTLR, 2000; Leather and Morrison, 
1997), housing consumers have a clear preference for older, masonry, dwellings 
(Young, 2002). The appeal of the masonry aesthetic together combines with the 
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culture of masonry craft to help perpetuate this trend (Clarke and Wall, 2000; Davis, 
2006). Second, UK house prices are notoriously volatile, creating a major challenge 
for economic management. This could be eased by using prefabrication to boost the 
slow response of housing supply to increased demand. Such a move is thwarted 
(amongst other things) by the extent of lock-in to masonry construction (Barker, 
2004). Third, there is a long tradition in the UK of prizing housing for its investment 
returns, and this has placed a premium for households and the construction industry 
on owner-occupation. Prefabrication, in contrast, has become associated with the 
social sector (Ross, 2002), and – thanks to it role in post-war reconstruction, and in 
the management of slum-clearance in the 1960s – with a presumption of transience. 
The fact that so many of the one million prefabricated units produced in the twentieth 
century were designed to be temporary may be one reason why the introduction by the 
UK government, in 2004 of a new policy requiring one in four publicly-funded social 
housing developments to be built using prefabrication (Hansard, 2003; The Housing 
Corporation, 2003), has not yet made much impact on the wider housing landscape. 
Notwithstanding skills shortages and increasing demand for faster construction, the 
majority of new homes built in the UK – around 85 per cent – are still constructed 
using traditional ‘brick and block’ masonry methods (Building Talk, 2006). Scotland 
is distinctive for the widespread use of prefabricated timber frames (in about 70 per 
cent of new construction according to Gibb (1999), which compares with 10 per cent 
for the UK as a whole).  
 
It is, nevertheless, the introduction of this 2004 policy promoting so-called ‘modern 
methods of construction’ that forms the empirical core of the paper, which is based on 
a range of qualitative and quantitative evidence collated by Lovell (2005).  The data 
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include twenty-five intensive interviews conducted in 2003 with UK government, 
housebuilders and consultants about the introduction of prefabrication as an element 
of social housing policy. The interviewees were identified initially from membership 
of relevant industry working groups, and subsequently using a ‘snowballing’ 
technique.  The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analysed using the 
qualitative software programme ‘ATLAS’. Additionally we refer to a postal survey of 
private sector UK housebuilders, conducted in 2004 in conjunction with the UK 
House Builders Federation to document builders’ experience of, and attitude towards, 
prefabrication.1  All housebuilders registered with the UK House Builders Federation 
were sent the three-page survey, which comprised eleven multiple-choice and short 
answer questions about the quantity of dwellings built each year and the construction 
methods and techniques they use. Because this paper is primarily conceptual in 
orientation, we draw lightly on these data to illustrate the core of the argument. 
Nevertheless, in selecting examples and quotations we have taken measures to 
represent the breadth and depth of the data more broadly. That is, we have drawn 
systematically on the data resources, rather than adopting a more pragmatic ‘note and 
quote’ approach. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first of the following sections, we describe the 
assemblage of the markets for masonry-built and prefabricated housing. Our concern 
here is with what those markets consist of and how they are put together; literally with 
their assemblage. We recognise that such markets are complex entanglements or 
networks of humans, materials, institutions, politics and technologies. To account for 
their shape we attend to the micro-structures of these markets and document their 
                                                 
1 The survey was mailed to one hundred and seventy-eight technical directors of private sector 
housebuilders in the UK, identified from the House Builders Federation’s contact database. A total of 
eighty-five completed surveys were returned: a response rate of forty-eight percent.   
 7 
operation as ‘collective calculating devices’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2003). This 
exercise is pretty much in line with the approach that has become common for those 
engaged in the interdisciplinary project of ‘unpacking’ the black box of the market 
(MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007; Mitchell, 2008; Pryke, 2007). Its novelty is in 
its application to markets for housing construction, and in showing how ‘calculation 
debates’ are implicated in the evaluation and comparison of these. 
 
In the second section of the discussion, we consider what happens when these 
different market assemblages are brought into competition or confrontation. We are 
specifically interested in the relationships between two such assemblages: markets for 
housing production that are anchored, respectively, on masonry methods and 
prefabrication.  The question of how whole systems (in this case of housing 
production) change through the encounter with the relatively distinct market 
assemblages comprising them is poorly understood. To explore it, we draw initially 
on the ideas in Pierre Bourdieu’s (2005) last monograph. Here, using the example of 
housing construction to elaborate some key principles of economic anthropology, 
Bourdieu talks about the ‘jostling’ that occurs among different ‘fields of force’ that 
surround and infuse competing market assemblages.  
 
‘Jostling’ is an activity that helps explain how firms come and go from the wider 
market for housing production in a process of incremental change. But to appreciate 
how such turnover adds up to a trajectory (a systematic shift or a determined stasis) 
other concepts are needed, and to this end we attempt to add substance to Callon’s 
rather over-used and perhaps under-theorised idea of agencement (Callon, 2007). 
Using the example of housing production, we carefully distinguish between 
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assemblage as an arrangement of a specific mix of materials and meanings within an 
actually existing market (for pre-fabricated or masonry built homes) and agencement 
as a property of the wider economy (of housing production) which has to do with how 
the arrangements of markets within it changes (or not).  
 
This is the starting point for the third section of the discussion which highlights the 
extent to which the problem of markets is a question of politics. On the one hand, the 
perspectives of material sociology and cultural economy provide the encouraging 
message that markets are not immutable. Their contents, values and outcomes are all 
amenable to change. On the other hand, the case of UK housing construction 
highlights the futility of government efforts to effect radical change without more 
clearly understanding the complexities of why a particular market – in this instance 
masonry housebuilding – enjoys a dominant position, or lock-in. 
 
The assemblage of markets for masonry and prefabrication 
The market for housing construction is generally depicted in rather narrow one-
dimensional terms, either focusing on economic rationality or technological 
innovation (Bramley, Bartlett and Lambert, 1995; Clarke and Wall, 2000). To meet 
our first aim – that of opening such markets to scrutiny from a mix of social science 
perspectives – we draw inspiration from a range of new ideas about how to ‘drill in’ 
to the complex yet specific arrangements of people and things that make up actually 
existing markets (MacKenzie, 2008; Pryke, 2007).  While there has been some 
interest in exploring these ideas in relation to housing markets (Munro and Smith, 
2008), mainly this work has cast light on the exchange of properties between 
households. However, we are interested in the question of housing production and 
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therefore with the institutional and material micro-structures of the masonry and 
prefabrication market assemblages.  This, in turn, may be key to understanding the 
pattern and dynamics of the housing system as a whole. Some key features of, and 
points of distinction between, masonry methods of construction and prefabrication are 
set out in Table 1. Most obviously, one market (masonry construction) is large and 
well established, while the other (prefabrication) is small and has never been more 
than a niche innovation. In all about 25,000 (fifteen per cent) of new homes per year 
are prefabricated. There are approximately thirty house building factories in the UK 
(Bingham, 2003), with the capacity to produce over thirty thousand prefabricated 
homes per year (Venables, Barlow and Gann, 2003). 
 
Apart from size, there is a raft of important technical differences that cement the 
distinction between prefabrication and masonry construction markets. Prefabrication 
involves the manufacture of house parts such as panels and modules (ready-made 
rooms) away from the construction site in a specially designed factory. The house 
parts are then transported to the building site and assembled quickly, often within a 
day, with wiring and plumbing already integrated inside them. In contrast, masonry-
built homes are built on-site and are craft-based: the process is slower and less 
precise, but also more flexible in a number of ways. For example, the exact layout and 
dimensions of masonry housing are not fixed until the project construction team is on-
site, and therefore planners can demand relatively last minute changes, prompting one 
interviewee to refer to the masonry construction process as “build and design” rather 
than “design and build” (Interview, Housing Association Project Manager, October 
2003).   Indeed, in a survey of UK prefabricated manufacturers the long lead-in time 
for design – termed ‘design freeze’ - was seen as the main disadvantage of using 
 10 
prefabrication (Venables, Barlow and Gann, 2003).  It is precisely this type of varied 
and complex interaction within housing construction markets (comprising intersecting 
technical, social and institutional factors) operating at a micro-structural level that is 
critical in helping us to understand how markets form and function.  
 
A characteristic of markets highlighted by micro-structural accounts such as this is 
that they have geographies and histories - they are embedded in particular places and 
evolve over time (Callon, Millo and Muniesa, 2007). We shall return to the 
importance of this in the next section. Here we concentrate on a theme which is 
critical to understanding the difference between the masonry and prefabrication 
assemblages, namely an interest in how particular arrangements of people, things, 
relationships, and devices are framed economically enabling them to operate as 
markets. This tradition of work in economic sociology is concerned, for example with 
how economic markets are separated out of the myriad connectivities in life and made 
into a recognisable, working mechanism of exchange (Callon, 1998b; Munro and 
Smith, 2008).  These ideas are especially illuminating when applied to debates about 
the relative merits of prefabrication and masonry construction. 
 
Discussion about whether prefabrication costs more or less than masonry construction 
has been highly contentious, and it is intriguing that, notwithstanding the historic role 
of prefabrication as a quick cost-effective solution to housing shortage or crisis, most 
evidence in play today points to building costs for prefabricated housing 
developments being approximately ten percent higher (Barker, 2003; Bingham, 2003; 
National Audit Office, 2005; Venables, Barlow and Gann, 2003). This figure prevails, 
and carries considerable weight in the ‘calculation debates’ around housing 
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construction, despite evidence that both its facticity and its composition are debatable. 
Such was the level of debate in the early years of the millennium that the government 
commissioned an extensive study on construction costs by the UK Audit Office. 
Intriguingly, this did little to clarify the situation. It revealed a big variation in costs 
from housing project to project – both for masonry and prefabrication housing 
developments.  Although it concluded that most prefabricated construction methods 
fall within the cost range of masonry (£600 to £1000 per square metre), it also noted 
that prefabricated dwellings tend, on average, to be more expensive to construct 
(National Audit Office, 2005).  The survey of private sector housebuilders conducted 
with the House Builders Federation also illustrates the level of uncertainty that 
circulates within the industry concerning the economic advantages of prefabrication 
relative to masonry technologies. It also shows how much of a barrier is posed by the 
‘facts’ associated with cost. Indeed, the high costs of prefabrication (capital and 
construction costs) were seen as the most significant barrier to its further adoption 
(see Table Two). The main drivers refer to the potential for increased profits, but 
these are much lower in the list.  
 
Perhaps the key aid to understanding what is happening here is Callon and Muniesa’s 
(2003; 2005) work on the constitution of markets as collective calculating devices.  
This account is important partly because it makes the point that calculation is 
distributed widely across the people and things of the market: it is not affected 
through a single price mechanism or even through some form of human agency alone. 
So it is not surprising that quantities like ‘costs’ and ‘price’ are hard to pin down: they 
are things which circulate and transform as they do so (Buenza, Hardie and 
MacKenzie, 2006), they are practices enacted for a range of difference ends (Munro 
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and Smith, 2008), and indeed they are stories which, as Velthius (2005) shows, are 
about rather more than simply money. On the one hand, this draws attention to the 
importance of interrogating in detail the variety of market devices that make such 
calculation possible (Callon, Millo and Muniesa, 2007). Most usefully for us, it shows 
how the practice of making things calculable (like that of calculation itself) is an 
uneven, unequal and contestable process in which, in our example, it might be argued 
that the masonry assemblage holds the upper hand. That is, masonry is the market 
assemblage whose definition of financial costs and benefits – and whose view of the 
relative importance of financial accounting in the process of innovation – prevails. In 
short, the difficulty in clarifying the precise costs of prefabrication stem ultimately 
from a masonry-dominated framing of the construction process.  The result is that, in 
effect, and as one interviewee suggested, trying to weigh up the financial merits of the 
two systems is like “comparing apples with pears” (Chair, Housing Forum Working 
Group on Prefabrication, December 2003).   
 
Callon and Muniesa (2003) provide a helpful way of thinking about the asymmetries 
within markets that underpin circumstances like this.  They refer to two kinds of 
asymmetry. First an imbalance in calculative power, reflecting the character and 
quality of calculating devices, the richness and competency of the networks they 
occupy and the extent to which buyers and sellers are informed, prepared and 
equipped for the transaction. Second, asymmetries flow from the degree of autonomy 
and heteronomy across different accounting systems: with the extent to which it is 
possible for one style of market to engage with another; with how effectively and with 
what resources bargaining can take place.  These ideas can usefully be used to 
interrogate the jostling we have identified between prefabrication and masonry 
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construction. Masonry construction has certainly annexed the calculative power in 
UK housing construction markets, i.e. the power to frame the argument economically 
and to define costs and benefits in a particular way. Further, because of the long-
standing dominance of masonry methods and the attachment this assemblage has 
forged with producers and consumers, masonry housing is a market that is easy to 
price and sell. Prefabrication has neither the autonomy from, nor the heteronomy 
with, masonry-build that is required to join this process. So, in terms of calculative 
power prefabrication remains at a disadvantage, as what is included or not in project 
balance sheets is defined in relation to masonry construction.  This is despite the fact 
that prefabrication advocates frequently and plausibly argue that, although 
prefabricated homes may appear to cost more, householders benefit from a higher 
quality product with far fewer defects. As one interviewee explains:  
 
"Cost wise prefabrication is… ten percent more expensive than traditional masonry 
build – that is the straight bottom-line cost. But you have to take into account the lack 
of defects, plus our ability to deliver for what we say it is going to cost… The 
[prefabrication] champions say – well let’s look back at traditional [masonry] 
construction projects, see how the costs escalated and the defects…..” 
(Interview, Operations Manager at a prefabrication manufacturer, November 2003). 
 
The costs of prefabrication are hence seen to be more inclusive: a greater proportion 
of costs are included ‘upfront’ in a quotation, such as labour costs, but there is no 
general acceptance or knowledge about these issues amongst housing producers and 
consumers. In Callon and Muniesa’s words they are ‘poorly equipped’ for the 
transaction (Callon and Muniesa, 2003). A survey of UK prefabrication 
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manufacturers, for example, identified lack of market demand and public perception 
as the two most important limitations on expansion (Venables, Barlow and Gann, 
2003), and the House Builders Federation survey revealed negative public attitudes 
about prefabricated homes to be the third most significant barrier to more widespread 
adoption (see Table Two).  Industry concerns appear to reflect public opinion: in a 
2001 MORI poll, 69% of respondents felt a brick-built home would fetch a better 
price (MORI, 2001). However, in another small-scale survey, all but one tenant of a 
new social housing prefabricated development in London said they would be willing 
to buy a similar home (Barker, 2003), suggesting that once residents have experience 
of living in a prefabricated home they feel more positive about it.   
 
The mixed evidence about the costs of prefabrication relative to masonry discussed 
above allows those who are opposed to prefabrication on other grounds (technical, 
institutional, cultural etc.) to frame their arguments in terms of economics. One 
interviewee highlights this tendency, referring to two prefabricated housing 
developments in London that were said to have overrun their budgets: 
 
"But Murray Grove and to some extent Raines Dairy were both criticised for being 
more expensive than the developer had originally thought. Now a lot of that was 
anecdotal material, it was never quantified…" 
(Interview, Director of a prefabrication construction institute, November 2003); 
 
and: 
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"People who look upon modular construction in a cynical light latch onto the ten 
percent higher cost….” 
(Interview, Project Manager at a Housing Association, October 2003).  
 
In other words, those who are not in favour of prefabrication tend to focus attention 
on cost. They create a rather simple calculation debate out of a more complex 
assemblage of activity, and use it not so much to make the entire market for housing 
construction ‘work’, as to make a bid for the dominant mode of production to remain 
in place. Calculation debates can thus be less a matter of fact and more a method of 
maintaining the status quo or ‘lock in’; a discursive contribution to the actancy of, and 
in, markets.  
 
More generally, examining the micro-structures of markets for housing construction 
focuses attention on the intricate networks of people and things that constitute the 
economy, thereby explaining why abstract models rarely fit the specifics of particular 
times and places. These approaches recognise the myriad forces in play and the hard 
work that goes into sustaining – for example – the construction of housing every 
minute of everyday. They recognise too that markets have to be made. But, 
notwithstanding the important beginnings laid out by Callon and Muniesa (2003; 
2005) the essentially descriptive exercises are less good at accounting for what 
happens (or what does not happen) when completely different and competing markets, 
such as masonry and prefabrication, are thrown together. They are only a starting 
point for explaining how markets change (or not). It is this issue of how whole 
(housing) systems change that we turn to next. 
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Conceptualising change in markets: the activity of inertia  
Perhaps because work on the sociology and anthropology of markets is a self-
consciously ‘bottom-up’ affair, the focus in the last few years has been on setting out 
what markets consist of (Callon, Millo and Muniesa, 2007; MacKenzie, Muniesa and 
Siu, 2007) and not on explaining how whole systems (e.g. of housing construction) 
change or stay the same That is not to say that these approaches fail to document 
change: the whole idea of ‘performing’ economy, for example, which has been so 
dominant in this work, is precisely about the way economic ideas make themselves 
true as they are put into practise.  However, it is probably fair to say that there is space 
for much more work within this tradition on the way whole systems change or 
transform.  Interestingly, there is one area of work indebted to the same roots (that of 
science and technology studies) that does take on this challenge, namely theories of 
socio-technical regime transitions (at least in relation to change in infrastructure 
systems, see Geels and Schot, 2007; Smith, Stirling and Berkhout, 2005). Authors 
working in this tradition have elaborated in detail on the pattern of change, most 
typically with respect to energy systems (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Lovell, 2007; 
Smith, Stirling and Berkhout, 2005).  
 
This literature on socio-technical regimes is helpful because, as with interdisciplinary 
theories of markets, the emphasis is the interplay between human actors and 
technologies. It is also innovative in its concern with the way regimes become 
‘locked-in’ to a particular technological trajectory over time (Berkhout, 2002; Unruh, 
2002).  Callon too talks about lock-in, which he defines in a positive light as a 
progressive narrowing of options for agents to draw boundaries or 'frames' of 
calculation in markets as technology and institutions become more established 
 17 
(Callon, 1998b).  For any given ‘economic market’ lock-in is seen as useful because it 
helps with the process of calculation by reducing uncertainties for market actors. As 
Callon explains "Once organised and hence locked-in, the market becomes calculable 
by the agents." (1998b: 50).  In contrast, and in our view more helpfully, the socio-
technical regime literature – perhaps because of its close attention to processes of 
innovation and change (often in relation to policy issues, see for example Geels and 
Schot, 2007; Smith, Stirling and Berkhout, 2005) – presents lock-in as more 
problematic. It may be a condition that is vital for markets to succeed, but equally it is 
a position that actively inhibits change.  Our work on the UK housing construction 
experience also points to the importance of attending to this flip side of change – to 
understanding not just how markets are established but also to examine the powerful 
forces (human and non-human) that keep them in place.  After all, it is not necessary 
to ‘buy in’ to the innovation of prefabrication to be surprised that masonry lock-in has 
not been loosened, given the degree of policy concern with the quality and quantity of 
UK housing. To account more fully for this inertia, it might seem logical to build 
mainly on the socio-technical regimes literature. However, this is limiting, because 
most pathways or models of change for socio-technical regimes have conceptualized 
change as a fairly linear affair (Geels and Schot, 2007), and this is at odds with ideas 
in economic and material sociology which draw attention to the multidimensionality, 
multi-directionality and, above all, non-linearity of the process. We therefore stick 
with this latter tradition, developing and extending some core ideas in order to better 
illuminate the dynamics of housing production markets.  
 
Jostling in a ‘field of force’ 
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The starting point for our analysis is in the ideas already discussed attending to the 
micro-structures and heterogeneity of markets. As we have seen, this work directs 
attention, above all, to the struggles and resources required to define and enact 
markets as ‘economic’. (i.e. with the way economic markets come into being). This is 
essentially Michel Callon’s project.  Pierre Bourdieu, in contrast, attempted in his last 
monograph, to weigh up competing claims for space within specific markets – claims 
which may be framed in a variety of ways around values that may not be economic. 
Interestingly, Bourdieu’s ideas were, like ours, based on an analysis of housing 
construction markets. In an empirical study of new housing construction in France, 
Bourdieu (2005) considered the way competing markets engage one another within 
what he calls a ‘field of force’. Core among Bourdieu’s ‘principles of economic 
anthropology’, the field of force is the setting in and through which different elements 
of the market assemblage (construction firms of different sizes and geographical 
reach, for example) jostle for position.  Bourdieu states that ‘the objective relations 
established between the different construction companies competing to win shares of 
this [the single-family house] market constitute between them a field of force, the 
structure of which, at a given moment, provides the basis for the struggles to conserve 
or transform that field’ (ibid. 2005: 39).  These struggles hinge around a mix of claims 
not just to economic superiority, but also to cultural, financial, technological, 
juridical, organization, commercial, social and symbolic capital. By profiling these 
heterogeneous influences ‘the notion of the field breaks with the abstract logic of the 
automatic, mechanical and instantaneous determination of prices in markets in which 
unfettered competition prevails’ (ibid. 2005: 196).   
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Again, this is a perspective with obvious application to our empirical case because it 
usefully accounts for the salience of a mix of social, institutional, cultural and 
technological factors impeding the take-up of prefabricated housing.  For instance, a 
key feature of the construction process of masonry housing is the ability for 
construction to stop and start at relatively short notice because of its limited ‘sunk 
costs’ and by virtue of the ease with which a large casual labour force can be laid off.  
The net effect is that the masonry assemblage is well-placed to respond to short and 
long-term fluctuations in demand for new housing, which makes it difficult for other 
types of housing construction, such as prefabrication, to compete.  The prefabrication 
market in contrast is an assembly of trained staff working in factories who are paid 
even if construction ceases. Further, a new prefabrication factory costs up to thirteen 
million pounds to build (Mornement, 2002):  that is, it is a substantial long-term 
commitment for a housing producer.  Crucially, once the investment is made, housing 
producers are committed to producing a minimum number of prefabricated dwellings 
each year, in order to cover costs, since the majority of factory overhead costs, for 
example electricity and rent, are fixed regardless of output.   
 
Notable struggles have also taken place between masonry and prefabrication 
assemblages with respect to mortgage lending and the durability of homes.  Masonry 
homes have a proven life-time of hundreds of years, and housing institutions and 
legislation have co-evolved with this technical characteristic. But other housing 
construction methods, including prefabrication, have much shorter design lives, 
typically in the order of sixty years.  The UK housing sector is not set up to respond to 
these different building materials and technologies and thus, for example, a leading 
mortgage lender will not lend money on a third of what it defines as ‘non-standard 
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building systems’, essentially prefabricated dwellings (The Housing Forum, 2001). 
The Operations Manager at a steel frame prefabricated company describes what he 
feels to be the prejudice of mortgage lenders against prefabrication, as follows: 
 
“The debates we've had with lenders are quite intriguing … their logic was that they 
were happy if I bought all the [housing] components and bolted them up on site.  
Then there wouldn't be an issue at all. But because I bolt them up in the factory, and 
deliver them on a lorry, there was an issue. Which is crazy, it doesn't make any sense 
whatsoever…  
Interviewer: Do you feel disadvantaged because you are using different methods?  
We are disadvantaged, but I can understand why because its new, and they are very 
very conservative people…I don't suppose they'll be happy until some of these 
buildings have been up a hundred years!” 
(Interview, Operations Manager at a steel-frame prefabricated company, November 
2003). 
 
These comments demonstrate the interconnectedness of technical, material and social 
aspects of masonry and prefabrication assemblages, and also highlight the difficulties 
of effecting change in a sector such as housing construction where one method of 
construction enjoys a position of dominance, or lock-in, precisely due to its 
entanglements with the wider world.  We see the technical, cultural and institutional 
bias towards the masonry assemblage in other arenas too.  Negative consumer opinion 
about prefabricated homes stems in part from an historical link between prefabrication 
and social housing in the UK: as noted, it is in the social housing sector that 
prefabrication has typically been used, and there have been a number of highly 
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publicised problems with prefabricated social housing in the past, such as the Ronan 
Point tower block collapse in the late 1960s (Ross, 2002).  
 
When combined with wide-ranging institutional support for masonry housing it is 
hard for the prefabrication assemblage to gain any ground as it jostles for position in 
the field of force comprising the system of housing construction.  In effect, the 
institutions set up to support housing construction in the UK revolve around masonry 
products and techniques: planners, insurers, contractors, surveyors, and mortgage 
lenders all act in ways which create masonry lock-in.  Table Three summarises the 
ways in which these actors have favoured the masonry assemblage over 
prefabrication. The situation exemplifies the complexity of creating change in a sector 
where one assemblage is locked-in, because opportunities for change hinge on the 
actions, beliefs and preferences of multiple organisations and things.   
 
The varied social and institutional aspects of the masonry assemblage have combined 
to create a distinct culture in UK housing construction, which acts in often subtle 
ways to exclude other types of market or assemblage, as one interviewee explained:    
 
“It’s a question of looking at [prefabrication] as a philosophy. Traditional [masonry] 
builders will continue to build on-site in traditional ways using traditional materials… 
I think there are many people in the building industry who are a bit long in the tooth. 
And they are the ones who are saying well this is the way we've always done it, so 
why should we change – it will reduce our profits.” 
(Interview, Director of a steel frame prefabricated company, October 2003). 
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The interviewee’s comments illustrate the jostling between the two assemblages at 
multiple levels: cultural, institutional as well as economic.  We suggest that 
Bourdieu’s close description of activities within a specific ‘field of force’ casts light 
on this encounter of masonry and prefabrication markets.  Indeed, Bourdieu (2005) 
himself uses this approach to help explain why the latter do less well. Although his 
analysis appears to hinge on a rather old idea of competition between firms, it does 
help him explain, for example, how the adoption of a new technique can alter the 
position of particular organisations, individuals or modes of construction in the field 
and hence change the shape of the field itself. Bourdieu’s account is perhaps most 
helpful in conceptualising incremental change; how firms come and go as their 
fortunes wax and wane through a process of jostling. There is no sense of how this 
might lead to the more structural shifts in the wider economy of housing construction 
that prefabrication might demand or enact. For this we return to Callon. 
 
Agencement in housing construction markets  
Recognising the agency within markets is also a way of recognising the capacity for 
change, and this is apparent in Callon and Muniesa’s (2003) account of the 
asymmetries of power between possibly-competing market assemblages. Perhaps in 
an attempt to pinpoint the mechanisms required to effect change in market, Callon 
(2006), has developed these ideas to propose a concept – agencement – which collects 
together the forces for, and factors in, market dynamics. Our evidence on how and 
why housing construction markets change (or remain the same) both draws from, and 
helps enlarge, this idea.   
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Callon borrows the label ‘agencement’ from Delueze and Guattari (2004), using it to 
refer to arrangements of people, things, materials, and their meanings and 
engagements, all of which, collectively, and as a matter of necessity and routine, have 
the capacity to act.  It is tempting to think of agencement as a descriptive noun: 
another word for the arrangement of people and things into ‘assemblages’ or networks 
for example. There is an extent to which this is implied in Callon’s own use of the 
word: it appeals to him partly because ‘it conveys the idea of a combination of 
heterogeneous elements that have been carefully adjusted to one another’ (Callon, 
2007: 319).  Like the term ‘assemblage’ (at least in its common usages) this use of 
agencement also implies – and perhaps makes more explicit than before – the salience 
of agency. As Callon (2007) goes on to say, agencements are arrangements whose 
capacity to act depends on their configuration, and this gesture towards the animation 
of assemblages is probably why the term is used by Muniesa, Millo and Callon. 
(2007) when they talk about market devices as agencements and by Hardie and 
Mackenzie (2007) when they refer to the agencement (the technical as well as social 
arrangements and interconnections that constitute and make possible the economic 
actancy) of a hedge fund.  
 
In contrast, when Munro and Smith (2008) talk about agencement in housing markets, 
they refer to the subjects, objects and practices implicated in the actualisation and 
animation (or not) of the entire system; i.e. of the entire collection of assemblages and 
devices that engage with the dynamics of housing, or housing construction, markets. 
This is more consistent with the third point Callon makes in his discussion of 
agencement when he says ‘there is nothing left outside’; there is, he says ‘no need of 
further explanation’ (2007: 337). This implies that to understand agencement is to 
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understand the entirety of a market: its varied assemblages, its many fields of force, 
everything that gives life to, for example, the production of housing. 
 
Building on the subtle distinction between agencement as a common noun, versus its 
use as an abstract noun, we have found it useful to think of agencement not (as it has 
become in common usage) as a term that is more or less interchangeable with 
assemblage, but rather as a property of the economy, or a quality in markets. Like 
MacKenzie we favour agencement “because the term’s usual English rendering as 
‘assemblage’… has somewhat too passive a connotation.” (MacKenzie, 2008: 21). 
Perhaps in contrast to MacKenzie, however, we use the term agencement not as an 
alternative (semantically more correct) word for ‘assemblage’, but as a notion that is 
conceptually different. The distinction is useful and important. Agencement captures a 
sense of how whole systems (of housing construction) change, either incrementally 
through a process of ongoing ‘jostling’, or more radically as completely different 
modes of construction (for example) are forced together.  It is an apposite way to 
account for why the dominant mode of housing construction – the socio-technical 
system that comprises the market for masonry building – is enacted, re-formatted and 
made to prevail; it is in that sense already a useful way of re-casting the discussion. 
However, it is a particularly salient idea when considering whether and to what extent 
an alternative mode of operation, such as prefabrication, can be brought into effect. 
This important distinction between assemblage (as description of what markets are, or 
consist of in particular places and times) and agencement (as an active property or 
quality of markets – the quality by which they change, or remain the same) focuses 
our attention towards masonry lock-in as an active process.  There are parallels here 
with Graham and Marvin’s (2001: 182) conceptualisation of infrastructure systems:  
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"Instead of being static material artefacts to be relied on without much thought, 
[infrastructure systems] are, in effect, processes that have to be worked towards... they 
are, in short, precarious achievements."   
 
Although Graham and Marvin’s comments are directed at analysis of change in 
infrastructure systems (energy, telecommunications etc.) they are ideas that can 
nevertheless usefully be applied to markets.   It reminds us that agencements are made 
up of a continual jostling not just within, but also between, between assemblages; and 
this jostling is a messy, unpredictable process.  In the case of UK housing 
construction, the outcome of the jostling between masonry and prefabrication has 
been notable for the extent to which, despite significant differences in masonry and 
prefabrication assemblages, the initial adoption of prefabrication by UK housing 
producers has resulted in a hybrid strategy blurring the boundaries of the two 
assemblages. In other words, housing producers have used prefabrication in 
conjunction with masonry. The House Builders Federation survey revealed that 71% 
of housebuilders are typically mixing prefabrication with masonry construction 
methods (see Table Four). What is curious is that they have created this hybrid with 
minimal adjustment to the process of construction. As a result, the survey indicates 
that 64% of private sector housebuilders constructing prefabricated dwellings 
purchase their components from an external manufacturer via short-term contracts of 
less than two years; we identified only one company with their own prefabrication 
factory (see Table Four).  
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Using contractors to supply prefabricated dwellings is perhaps an understandable 
reaction to the uncertainty of adopting a new technology (an attempt to reduce risk) 
but some problems have resulted.  For instance, many of the prefabrication 
manufacturers in the UK from whom housebuilders are purchasing are not housing 
specialists. Rather, their experience is in commercial buildings, including hotels, 
restaurant chains, and office buildings (Yorkon, 2004).  Interviews highlighted how 
insufficient consideration has been given by these manufacturers to adapting their 
construction methods to the residential sector. For example, issues such as poor 
acoustic performance within steel frame buildings have been given little attention. 
Whilst noise transference is generally not important within offices, it certainly is for 
high density residential flats, because noisy neighbours can create significant 
disturbance (Harris, 2004; Jones, 2003).  More critically, in some instances 
manufacturers have claimed their prefabrication technologies have independent 
buildings accreditation, which is important in gaining a mortgage.  However, on 
closer examination housebuilders purchasing their products have discovered that the 
accreditation relates only to commercial prefabricated buildings, and not to housing 
(Harris, 2004).  
 
The hybrid outcome of the jostling between masonry and prefabrication also runs into 
difficulties in relation to other technical construction issues.  Because masonry homes 
are craft-based (i.e. individuals build the houses with inevitable minor discrepancies), 
it is difficult to mix masonry construction with other more precisely engineered, high-
technology construction methods, such as prefabrication. The operations manager at a 
leading prefabricated steel-frame manufacturer explains as follows: 
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“the problems are [at] the interfaces between the different work packages… our 
[steel prefabricated] construction is very accurate, and we deliver to site with 
fixed dimensions… with traditional masonry construction… people actually 
stand on site and say let’s do this, or let’s do that.” 
(Interview, Operations Manager at a steel-frame prefabricated company, 
November 2003). 
 
It might be thought that hybrid housing construction markets would be a step on the 
path to greater diversity in housing production, creating a space for prefabrication to 
co-exist with traditional methods (and perhaps success then in some settings). 
However, the hybrid formula is in practice a variant of traditional masonry methods 
and is generally less satisfactory than the original (Lovell, 2005; Ross, 2002). The fact 
that there is little risk of systemic technical failure is, for example, a positive feature 
of masonry heavily promoted by those with interests in this type of construction. 
Although individual masonry homes may have so-called ‘snagging’ problems post-
occupancy, because they are all built individually, these types of problems are not 
going to manifest in all homes.  In this respect masonry differs significantly from 
prefabrication, where house parts are built on a construction line using the same 
technology. With prefabrication it is likely that if a defect found, then it will be 
common to all dwellings built using that particular technology.  This so-called 
‘systemic failure’ has occurred with prefabricated housing in the past, and negative 
consumer and industry attitudes about prefabricated housing – based on this historical 
experience - are a continuing influence.  For example, the Housing Forum, a 
government-sponsored organization encouraging innovation in the UK housing 
sector, concludes in a report on the potential for prefabrication in the UK: 
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"Talking with various stakeholders in the industry has revealed much scepticism 
about offsite [prefabrication] manufacture, mainly because of previous experience 
with system or 'non-traditional' housing. Failures in these historic systems have made 
many - in particular surveyors and lenders - cautious about embracing the new 
generation of systems.”  
(The Housing Forum 2001: 17, emphasis added). 
 
Indeed, as discussed, because of the risk of systemic failure UK mortgage lenders 
have been reluctant to lend money on contemporary prefabricated homes, and this has 
had significant repercussions for the viability of prefabrication.  This issue 
demonstrates the ability of assemblages to remain stable over time – in effect 
historical social and institutional issues have been carried forward with the 
prefabrication technology even as, as proponents of ‘modern’ prefabrication would 
claim, concerns about systemic failure are now unfounded. 
 
Another revealing hybrid strategy adopted by UK housebuilders to counteract the 
negative public associations between prefabrication and poor quality low-income 
housing has been to build prefabricated dwellings with a brick outer layer so they 
resemble masonry-built homes (Brinkley, 2001; Edge, 2002; Smit, 2002).  The House 
Builders Federation survey revealed that eighty-one percent of the companies 
constructing prefabricated dwellings have designed them in traditional masonry 
styles. One housebuilder explained their reasons for doing so as follows: 
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“One of the main problems we perceive in the marketplace is perception of modular 
or offsite manufacture. People still think back to little boxes of the 1960s. We are 
really trying to make a statement in the marketplace that it can really look like 
whatever you want it to. What that means is that we have developed a module that 
requires [masonry] cladding on the outside.” 
(Interview, Operations Manager at steel-frame prefabrication company, November 
2003). 
 
Similarly, in discussing a new social housing prefabricated development it is observed 
by an industry journalist that: 
 
"When the initial prototype [prefabricated] houses were unveiled…they came in 
for some criticism for the ordinariness of their design and their resemblance to a 
housebuilders standard house type. That is now part of the appeal for the 
occupants. ‘People look at them and think they are private houses', says [a local 
resident] ‘from the outside you wouldn't believe it's a modular [prefabricated] 
house.’"  
(Smit, 2002: 12). 
 
In this use of masonry cladding we see an attempt by prefabrication housing 
producers to respond to masonry lock-in by a strategy of alignment rather than 
distinction. In other words, prefabricated homes are being built which closely 
resemble those produced by masonry methods, whereas an alternative strategy would 
be to use the technological capabilities of prefabricated homes to build dwellings with 
a very different appearance, and, whilst this approach has been taken in some 
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prefabricated housing developments (see Greenwich Millennium Village, 2003; Hyde 
Housing Association, 2004) it is not the industry norm.  
 
More could be said about the jostling of assemblages in the agencement of the 
economy of housing construction. However, two things are already clear from this 
brief overview of the social, technical and institutional melée that constitute such 
markets. First, the financial bottom line is a powerful tool, which dominates key 
debates in a way which itself testifies to how masonry as a market assemblage retains 
the balance of power. Second, however, the lock-in to masonry build is sealed by 
much more than a calculation debate.  Even if masonry’s claim to cost-effectiveness 
were unsettled through (say) incentives or other cost-adjusting innovations, the 
sociality, technicality and institutionalization of the market for housing construction is 
a powerful force which – in this case – makes for limited innovation in the 
agencement of the system as a whole. 
 
The governance of markets and the role of the state  
Having illustrated how the masonry construction market maintains its position of 
‘lock-in’ through activity rather than inertia, in this final section of the paper we 
consider more explicitly what human agency can do within this. The ‘performative’ 
turn that underpins the conceptualisation of markets we are working with recognises 
that if the economy has to be made, then it could potentially be made differently 
(Callon, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006; Smith, Munro and Christie, 2006).  Here, therefore, 
we consider the politics and policies which enact or hinder change, showing what the 
UK government has done to encourage prefabrication and assessing its likely success.  
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One major reason behind the current government’s interest in promoting prefabricated 
housing is a growth in the number of households in the UK: the demand for 
affordable housing exceeds supply.  The number of households is predicted to rise by 
3 million by 2016, on average 230,000 per year, driven primarily by changing 
lifestyles as more people live on their own. The Treasury’s Barker Review of Housing 
Supply warned of the consequences of poor housing supply in the UK, including 
fluctuations in the economy and affordability problems (Barker, 2004). The reasons 
for persistent under-supply of new housing are complex, but some commentators 
believe that greater use of prefabrication could help rectify the problem, for example 
because prefabrication can increase the speed of house building, reducing the time 
spent on the construction site by approximately half (Bingham, 2003; The Housing 
Forum, 2001). Other reasons for government interest in encouraging prefabrication as 
an alternative to masonry construction include: prefabricated dwellings typically have 
fewer defects, there may be fewer workplace accidents and less impact on local 
residents during construction, and the dwellings are typically more energy efficient, 
involve less transport of materials, and produce less waste (Gorgolewski, Milner and 
Ross, 2001; National Audit Office, 2005; Taylor, 2003; The Housing Forum, 2001). 
There is also some evidence to suggest that the government has an interest in 
prefabrication as a way of changing the culture of UK housebuilding.  Housebuilders 
are typically perceived of as slow to innovate and often delivering a poor quality 
product (DTI, ODPM and DEFRA, 2003; Hetherington, 2002; ODPM, 2003a). The 
government for example has described prefabrication as vital in "… achieving a step 
change in the construction industry to produce the quantity and also the quality of 
housing we need." (ODPM, 2003a: 10, emphasis added). 
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Among the sociologists of the market, Bourdieu (2005) is the one who – using 
housing construction – makes the most concerted and specific reference to the role of 
politics and the state, as he explains: “the economic field is, more than any other, 
inhabited by the state which contributes at every moment to its existence and 
persistence and also to the structure of the relations of force that characterise it’ 
(2005: 12).  Thinking about market agencements as a process – an active changeable 
property or quality of markets - rather than a description of them (an assemblage), has 
important implications for considering the role of the state in markets.  Viewing the 
economy as performative highlights how markets are potentially open to change – 
including that effected (deliberately or inadvertently, and with unintended as well as 
intended consequences) through government intervention.  Markets are not 
immutable, and there is hence the possibility of government constructing and 
reworking almost any element of how they operate. More problematically, however, it 
raises questions about precisely how to enact different markets.  There is a 
requirement here for a state wishing to effect change to conceive of markets and 
intervene in them using more subtle approaches than those typically employed by 
policy makers. For instance, the introduction of the 2004 social housing policy 
requiring a quarter of new publicly-funded social housing to adopt prefabrication in 
England and Wales has in retrospect been rather a blunt tool to encourage uptake in 
light of the lock-in of masonry construction discussed here.  Prefabrication is so 
effectively ‘locked out’ that what seems like a concerted attempt to intervene by 
government appears to have failed (Building, 2002; Mornement, 2002; Weaver, 
2003). There is evidence, moreover, of a hands-off approach by government in its 
implementation of the target, illustrated by comments from the senior manager at the 
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Housing Corporation responsible for the government’s prefabrication target who 
commented:  
 
“…at the end of the day, all the government can do is provide the right 
circumstances for it [prefabrication] to blossom. And it will either blossom, or it 
won’t.” 
(Interview, Head of Procurement, The Housing Corporation, October 2003). 
 
But a second approach adopted by the UK government to help promote prefabrication 
– implemented in conjunction with the 25% social housing target - suggests more 
positively that government does have an appreciation of the cultural aspects of 
markets.  This is the attempt to change the discourse about factory-based housing 
technologies: there has been a government-driven effort to avoid use of the term 
‘prefabrication’ and refer to factory-based construction instead as ‘modern methods of 
construction’, largely in an effort to dissociate contemporary factory-produced 
housing from its historical technical problems.  For example, an industry interviewee 
explains the government’s desire to change the terminology of factory-based housing 
as follows: 
 
"… there is too much stigma attached to prefab… or anything with the word system 
building. The stigma of the 1960s is still very strong.” 
(Interview, Director of a prefabrication construction institute, November 2003); 
 
and a statement by the government-sponsored organisation, the Housing Forum, who 
has been promoting prefabrication also clearly illustrates the importance of discourse: 
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"Prefabrication, at least as far as housebuilding in this country is concerned, is a term 
that implies criticism, because of its connections with temporary housing in the past. 
It is in the interests of the building industry to avoid using the term 'prefabrication’” 
(The Housing Forum, 2001: 53, emphasis added). 
 
Since the late 1990s, therefore, various new terms for factory-based housing have 
been promoted by government, in conjunction with a number of housebuilders and 
manufacturing companies, with ‘modern methods of construction’ as the latest 
incarnation (see Figure One). The discursive strategy has involved stressing the high 
quality construction of modern prefabricated dwellings, as an (implicit) contrast to 
historical prefabricated housing, as well as to contemporary masonry methods 
(Gorgolewski, Milner and Ross, 2001; Hansard, 2003; ODPM, 2003a; The Housing 
Forum, 2001).  
 
The government’s approach of trying to change the discourse of prefabrication may 
be well-founded, recognising as it does that cultural and institutional issues are 
hampering uptake of prefabrication, and understanding that these often complex 
factors have a profound influence on the economics of prefabrication.  But arguably 
this is the tip of the iceberg. Government intervention is unlikely to succeed without 
tackling the more fundamental (and even less obviously political) aspects of market 
framing, for instance the politics of calculation, that is determining what is inside and 
outside of project accounts. There is also a need to recognise the sociality and 
materiality – the complexity and interconnectedness – of markets; how costs, prices 
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and values are constituted through a hybrid combination of economics, social, 
political, cultural, technical and institutional factors.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have, by way of one empirical example, offered an account of how 
markets change and why – sometimes – they do not. Combining theoretical 
inspiration from recent work on the cultural economy and material sociology of 
markets, with empirical research on innovation in the home building industry, the 
analysis confronts a paradox in UK housing construction, namely its ‘lock-in’ to 
masonry methods. The market for masonry housing construction is a socio-technical 
assemblage which endures, despite recognised shortcomings and notwithstanding a 
political steer towards other construction techniques with apparent technical and 
economic advantages. To explain this, the three sections of the paper weigh up the 
forces for inertia against the impulse for change in UK housing construction. 
 
First, we described the assemblage of two kinds of market for housing construction: 
craft-based masonry methods, and factory-based prefabrication. We argued that these 
market assemblages may, following Callon and Muniesa (2003; 2005), usefully be 
conceptualised as collective calculating devices, whose economic content – whose 
workings as markets – has to be actively made. In the case of housing construction 
markets, the resulting calculation debate is key to the differentiation of the two styles 
of market. We suggest that in this very visible debate the case for and against 
innovation hinges on financial costs and benefits. Although the balance is by no 
means clear cut, the tendency to frame the encounter between two styles of market as 
a struggle for economy is one whose tone and terms favours masonry methods.  
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Second, however, we turned more explicitly to the question of how systems of 
housing production change, or do not, when faced with innovation. Two sets of ideas 
proved helpful here. First, Bourdieu’s conception of firms jostling within a ‘field of 
force’ offers a way of understanding how one assemblage (e.g. prefabrication) might 
incrementally displace another (e.g. masonry methods). Second, Callon’s notion of 
agencement provides a framework with which to account for what happens when 
markets collide. Although there is a tendency in the wider literature to use the term 
agencement interchangeably with ‘assemblage’, we regard it rather distinctly as a way 
of understanding how whole (housing) economies (and the market assemblages 
comprising them) do or do not change. Using this framework we were able to identify 
forces for change in the technical, material and cultural economy; but equally we 
showed that these are the arenas in which the effort to keep things the same is most 
firmly rooted. So this part of the analysis not only illustrates how inertia is achieved, 
but also highlights the sheer effort required to keep things the same. UK housing 
construction markets may appear to be in steady state; but such inertia is an active 
process by which the masonry assemblage invests a great deal of power and resources 
in resisting change and maintaining its dominance.  
 
Callon’s notion of an agencement is helpful in understanding the multiple components 
that constitute whole market systems; but its usage to date has been less helpful in 
conceptualizing the way markets change over time, with or without the impulse of 
policy and politics. We find in Callon’s work only the beginnings of an explanation of 
why masonry lock-in has not been loosened; indeed, as noted Callon sees lock-in as a 
largely positive feature of markets – the endpoint of a process of ‘becoming 
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economic’ rather than a position in the midst of struggle and change.  There is an 
obvious tension here in the role of lock-in within markets, for although there is a need 
to have some degree of order and stability in markets so that they are workable and 
understandable to market actors (Callon’s approach), this then becomes problematic 
for governments and others trying to effect innovation and change (the socio-technical 
regime approach). We suggest this tension over lock-in is really at the heart of the 
notion of agencement: whereas assemblage is focused on the internal constitution of 
markets – their structures, framings and the mapping of relations - agencement is a 
more dynamic and outward-looking concept which concentrates on the processes, 
agency and mutability of markets.  
 
Finally, we turned to the politics of markets, acknowledging that if markets have to be 
made – instituted, practiced and performed – then this could itself be an active 
process. The analysis however shows that one reason that politicians have hitherto 
favoured prefabrication to rather little avail is that interventions have been based on a 
partial understanding of how markets change. A firmer conceptual distinction 
between the terms assemblage and agencement might make for new insight into the 
complexity of how markets work. And this, without offering policy makers the key to 
a ‘quick fix’, may at least provide governments with a sense of the size and subtlety 
of the challenge they seek to address. 
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